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salt

OLC 72-0712

15 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Public Disclosures of Soviet Military Data

1. At the Director's briefing of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Tuesday, 13 June 1972, Acting Chairman Chet Holifield (prompted by George Murphy of the Committee staff) queried the Director about the public disclosure of certain data on Soviet weapon data. Mr. Holifield (and later Mr. Murphy) referred to public statements by Dr. Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Laird, and other Administration officials and to a recent article by Stewart Alsop. Senator Stuart Symington later on the same day questioned Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer on the same subject.

2. The instances referred to by Mr. Holifield were:

a. Dr. Kissinger's Moscow press conference on 27 May 1972 (Tab A), and

b. An article by Stewart Alsop entitled "How Safe Is Salt?" which appeared in the 5 June 1972 issue of Newsweek (Tab B).

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NEWSWEEK
5 JUN 1972
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BY STEWART ALSOP

HOW SAFE IS SALT?

WASHINGTON—By all right-thinking persons, SALT is regarded as a Good Thing. It may well be a good thing, if the only alternative is an uncontrolled arms race. Even so, serious people ought to be asking themselves serious questions about SALT. For example, why have the Russians made the vast effort and investment required to make what some intelligence analysts, in awed tones, call "The Big One"?

The Big One—it has, as yet, no official title—is the big brother of the SS-9 missile itself more than twenty times as powerful as our Minuteman. There was a report in this space some months ago about the holes being dug for this new and huger missile but, at the time, it was thought that the holes might be for command or control, or some other purpose.

Since then, as The New York Times (no organ of the military-industrial complex) reported in April, there has been absolute confirmation that 25 of the 91 new holes being dug in the Soviet missile bases are designed to receive an enormous new missile. It is estimated that the big one will be capable of throwing a warhead with twice the power of the 25-megaton SS-9—"fifty megatons plus, maybe a lot plus."

The new missiles have been "pad-tested," but not flight-tested. They were ready for flight tests well before the Moscow summit, but the Russians have been polite enough to hold off testing until after Mr. Nixon left Moscow. Tests are expected any day now.

OVERKILL

The mystery about the big one—and the SS-9 too, for that matter—is this: a missile with a single enormous warhead is a lousy weapon. It overkills at the center. It is like using a sledge hammer to kill a fly. A 1- or 2-megaton warhead—like those on our 1,000 Minuteman missiles or the 900 Soviet SS-11s—is quite adequate to make a hideous shambles of any great city.

A single multimegaton warhead is not even a good counterforce weapon. For example, to dig our thousand concrete-protected Minuteman missiles out of their widely dispersed concrete silos, what is needed is great numbers of smaller, very accurate warheads. So why have the Russians made their vast investment in 50-megaton and 25-megaton warheads?

There are a number of possible explanations. The Russians have always liked big bangs. The Czar Cannon—the biggest artillery piece ever built till its time, though it never worked—is still proudly enshrined in the Kremlin. The Russians also like to "overtake and surpass" the United States, and in terms of megatonnage for their missiles they have certainly done that. Whereas this country has more than twice the number of deliverable nuclear warheads, over-all, the Soviet land-based missile force of 1,600-plus missiles can throw at least five times the megatonnage of our 1,000-plus force.

ANOTHER ANSWER

SALT is still a good deal for the United States as long as this is so, because more, smaller nuclear warheads accurately delivered are a better investment, in the peculiar nuclear mathematics, than fewer, bigger warheads. But it may not be a good deal for long. It may be a very bad deal.

For there is another possible answer to the question asked above. The Russians may be confident that they can MIRV their big ones, and their SS-9s too, well within SALT's agreed time limit. There is nothing in SALT to prevent them from doing so.

MIRV-ing a nuclear warhead is a bit like slicing a pie. The bigger the pie, the more slices. The bigger the warhead, the more MIRV's—multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles. We put three MIRV's into our Minuteman 3. If they could match us in MIRV technology, the Russians could put ten or more extremely powerful and highly accurate MIRV's into their 288 SS-9s, and twenty or more into the big ones they are getting ready to put into those 25 silos.

Under the SALT agreement, our anti-missile defense is virtually useless—a single ABM complex cannot defend the Minuteman complex. The conclusion is obvious. If the Russians are in fact able to master MIRV technology, they will be able to threaten the virtually total destruction of our land-based retaliatory missile force in a first strike. This is the central risk involved in the SALT agreement. It is not good enough to dismiss the risk with clichés about the military-industrial complex.

The more sophisticated of the SALT-at-any-price people are perfectly aware that the risk exists. ("You're not going to write about [that], are you?" one asked. "You'll be all alone with Barry Goldwater and the American Security Council.") But they dismiss the risk as minimal, and well worth taking.

They may be right. The Soviets are unquestionably behind on MIRV technology--their test of a triple-targeted SS-9 involved a mechanical contraption on wires, worthy of Rube Goldberg. Yet the intelligence has consistently underestimated the Russian technological capability of doing what they are determined to do. This was true from the first Soviet atomic and hydrogen weapons right through to the remarkable technical achievements required to produce the SS-9 and the big one.

But how much would it really matter, the SALT-at-any-price people ask, even if the Russians could theoretically destroy the U.S. land-based missile force in a first strike? We could still, in de Gaulle's phrase, *'arracher un bras*—tear off an arm. If not with our obsolescent bombers, surely with our nuclear submarines, we could still inflict immensely painful damage on the Soviet Union.

BACKDOWN

This is almost certainly true. But it is also true that many thoughtful and well-informed people believe that there is a profoundly important psychological-political factor in the insane nuclear equation. Such men—Henry Kissinger is one of them—are convinced, for example, that the 6-to-1 U.S. preponderance in nuclear missile power, which made theoretically rational a U.S. first strike, was the central factor in Khrushchev's backdown at the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. This despite the fact that in a nuclear exchange the Soviets even in 1962 could have torn off an arm—they could have destroyed New York and other big American cities.

This is why serious people ought to be asking themselves serious questions about SALT. For example: How would some future President react, eyeball to eyeball with some future Khrushchev, if he knew that his choice lay between backing down—way down—and a senseless act of revenge that would also be an act of national suicide? And if the nuclear balance of power no longer matters, so long as we retain the means to arracher un bras, why have the Russians made such an enormous effort to make sure that the balance is in their favor? The Russians are serious people.

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TOTAL EMBARGO UNTIL May 26, 1972
11:00 P.M. MOSCOW TIME

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Moscow, U.S.S.R.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND
AMBASSADOR GERARD C. SMITH, DIRECTOR
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
SPASO HOUSE

10:05 P.M.

MR. ZIEGLER: Gentlemen, we have only a very short period here. Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Smith are here to provide you with some general details about the agreement which will be signed tonight at about 11:00 o'clock at the Kremlin. It will be signed at the same location in which the other agreements have been signed between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The material that we are giving you now, the Fact Sheet and also the comments that Dr. Kissinger will make, will be embargoed totally until 11:00 o'clock, or at the time of the signing ceremony. I believe the signing ceremony will be carried on television into the Press Center so that you will be able to observe it at that time.

As we mentioned to you in the briefing earlier today, immediately following the signing ceremony, within 20 or 30 minutes after the signing ceremony, we will have available to you at the Press Center copies of the agreement, and representatives from both delegations will be there to take your questions and to discuss the agreement with you at that time.

The purpose for this briefing is simply to give you a general outline as to how the agreement developed. As you see, Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Smith are here now, so I will give you Dr. Kissinger. This is on the record.

DR. KISSINGER: Gentlemen, I thought that the most useful thing I could do was to give you a general background of these negotiations and of the President's view of the treaty, and Ambassador Smith, of course who has conducted the negotiations and brought them to this conclusion is in the best position to go through the details of the agreement.

First of all, let me say on behalf of the President that he certainly will take occasion to express personally that the reason we are here is the dedication and work of the delegation in Helsinki which has been led by Ambassador Smith. He has come here straight from the airport. He has been working on the final work of this agreement since 5:00 o'clock this morning. This concludes a rather hectic week for everybody who has been connected directly or indirectly with these negotiations.

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Let me make a few general observations before I turn this over to Ambassador Smith.

Nothing that this Administration has done has seemed to it more important for the future of the world than to make an important first step in the limitation of strategic arms.

All of us have been profoundly convinced that to arrest the arms race is one of the over-riding concerns of this period. Now it is a subject of enormous technical complexity, and for the two great nuclear powers to make a beginning in putting their armaments under some restraint required political decisions and an enormous amount of technical work.

It is a process that has continued for many years. It started with extensive technical studies in Washington. It went through two and one half years of negotiations alternating between Helsinki and Vienna. It has been brought to a conclusion because both governments decided that in an agreement of this kind the stakes were larger than the simple technical issues; that what was at stake was a major step toward international stability, confidence among nations, and a turn in the pattern of post-war relationships.

This is why at various crucial moments in these negotiations there had been direct contacts between the President and Soviet leaders, which led by mutual agreement to breakthroughs -- the first on May 20 of 1971, in which there was an agreement that broke the deadlock that had developed between the Soviet insistence that an agreement cover antiballistic missile systems only, and our view that an agreement involved as well the offensive weapons.

The compromise was that the initial treaty would deal with ABM's, and that this would be accompanied by a freeze on certain categories of offensive weapons. The next deadlock developed over the issue of what offensive weapons should be included, whether it should be confined to intercontinental ballistic missiles or whether submarine-launched ballistic missile systems should also be involved. The answer -- this deadlock was broken at the end of April and in large part by direct contact between the Soviet leaders and the President and it has finally resulted in the present agreement which Ambassador Smith has just brought back from Helsinki and which will be signed at 11:00.

Ambassador Smith is in the best position to explain the provisions of this agreement, but I wanted to make a few general observations about its significance and how it should be looked at.

The first point to make is that in an agreement that involves the central armaments on both sides, it is foolish or shortsighted to approach the negotiations from the point of view of gaining a unilateral advantage. Neither nation will possibly put its security and its survival at the hazard of its opponent and no agreement that brings disadvantage to either side can possibly last and can possibly bring about anything other than a new circle of insecurity. Therefore, the temptation that is ever present when agreements of this kind are analyzed as to who won is exceptionally inappropriate.

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We have approached these negotiations from the very beginning with the attitude that a wise proposal is one that is conceived by each side to be in the mutual interest and we believe that if this agreement does what we hope it will, that the future will record that both sides won.

Secondly, let me make a few observations with respect to the freeze of offensive weapons which has perhaps some of the more complicated provisions and the anticipation of which has aroused some anticipatory comments in the United States.

First, the freeze concerns only two categories of offensive weapons; that is to say, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles. It does not include the number of warheads, nor does it include bombers, nor does it include, obviously, other systems based elsewhere than at sea or in the territory of each country.

Secondly, in assessing the significance of the freeze, it is not useful to analyze whether the freeze reflects a gap between the forces that are being frozen.

In the two categories that are being frozen, that is to say ICBMs and submarine launched ballistic missiles, the facts are these: The Soviet Union has more intercontinental ballistic missiles than the United States. The Soviet Union has been building intercontinental ballistic missiles; the United States has not and has no such program at the moment.

The Soviet Union has been building submarine launched ballistic missiles at the rate of eight submarines a year. The United States has at this moment no submarines under construction.

Therefore, the question to ask in assessing the freeze is not what situation it perpetuates, but what situation it prevents. The question is where we would be without the freeze. And if you project the existing building programs of the Soviet Union into the future, as against the absence of building programs over the period of the freeze in either of the categories that are being frozen, you will get a more correct clue to why we believe that there is a good agreement and why we believe that it has made a significant contribution to arresting the arms race.

The weapons are frozen, as we pointed out, in categories in which we have no ongoing programs. Now, having said this, however, I am not implying that we gained a unilateral advantage because it is perhaps true that in the ABM field we had the more dynamic program which is being arrested as a result of these developments.

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What I am saying is that this agreement has been made through a long process of negotiations; that this week, while our delegation was working around the clock in Helsinki, the President met with the Soviet leaders extensively and some members of the American delegation had extensive talks with Deputy Prime Minister Smirnoff and Foreign Minister Gromyko to resolve those issues that required a primarily political decision.

The reason it was possible to achieve such an agreement is because we are confident it will be seen to be in the common interest of both countries and in the common interest of humanity. That is what I wanted to say on behalf of the President.

I would like again to express our appreciation to Ambassador Smith, who has borne up under great strain and who has details of the agreement before him.

I will let him comment on those and then both of us will be available to answer questions.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I understand I am going to have an opportunity later to go into greater detail with you all about the specific provisions of the treaty and the interim agreement, so perhaps at this time I should limit myself to trying to make some general observations and then later on try to answer your questions and even later on than that go into any specific provisions that are of special interest.

First, let me say perhaps the obvious, that these documents are the product of long, careful, complex and exhaustive negotiations. As a matter of fact, we were not finished with the last detail after we got on the airplane this evening in Helsinki. We flew back. I invited some of the Soviet delegation, including the Chief Delegation Minister, Semenov, to join us and we continued to work on our way here to Moscow. So this is about the freshest treaty that I have ever talked about.

I think that in sum, these documents, when you look at them carefully, will demonstrate a solid, concrete, yet first step in the problem of controlling strategic arms. They are not the end of the road by any means, but I think that they are a very solid step forward.

You know we have an obligation that sometimes people forget under the Nonproliferation Treaty of some years ago to get on with trying to limit strategic arms and get on with disarmament. I think as a general proposition these documents will show that we are not lax in that respect. We are conscious of our responsibilities.

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Now, as Henry said, there are two basic documents here, the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement which, in effect, is a negotiating freeze arrangement to hold the situation, to permit us to hopefully negotiate a treaty to match in the offensive field the treaty that we have succeeded in negotiating in the defensive field.

In the defensive field, I would urge you to look very carefully at the language of Article I which looks very general but to my mind is a most significant step forward in relations between two great powers.

In effect, it says that neither side is going to try to defend its nationwide territory. This is an admission of tremendous psychological significance, I believe, recognition that the deterrent forces of both sides are not going to be challenged.

When you think of the concerns that we have had for the last 25 years about first-strike and counter-force, it seems to me a general recognition by both countries that they are not going to field a nationwide system is of first importance, political, psychological and militarily.

In addition to that, the countries are going to agree not to lay the base for such a nationwide system. That got us into all sorts of radar problems which some of you people perhaps felt we took too long in solving, but much of the time we have spent was in trying to wrestle with this radar problem to prevent the possibility of a nationwide system arising.

In addition to that, the two nations have made commitments not to even try for a thick or regional defense in one part of the country except as specifically permitted under the agreement; that is, to defend one's capital or to defend a relatively small number of ICBM silos.

So, although Article I looks like sort of a general statement, to my mind it is one of the most significant articles in the whole agreement.

Now, Article II defines what we are talking about and has a very important bearing on the whole question of what we call future ABM systems. This treaty has as a most significant aspect that it not only limits the present situation, but has a choking off effect on future systems which, under the terms of the treaty as we have reached understandings, futures will not be deployable unless this treaty is amended.

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Article III is the heart of the treaty and deserves a great deal of study. I think we spent more time trying to wrestle with Article III than any other part of the treaty.

I will go into details later if you like, but it says both sides can have two sites with no more than 100 launchers at each site, with radar sharply limited; one site for the defensive capital and one for the ICBM's. The Soviets will agree to deploy the ICBM site well away from the capital site, so the possibility for a base of a nationwide system is very poor.

In addition to the numbers, we have had to work out problems involving test ranges, numbers of test launchers, the question of modernization, the question of how you verify this treaty, and one of the significant conclusions that we have reached is that this treaty can safely be verified by national means of verification, that is, without on-site inspection. This is largely a limitation on numbers of relatively large objects which we are confident can be monitored, if you will, without on-site inspection.

As a matter of fact, if I had my "druthers" and could have on-site inspection instead of our present national means, there would be no question in my mind that we would be much better off with national means of verification.

In addition to that, we will have commitments from the Soviets not to interfere with those national means of verification and not to take measures to conceal their operation so as to prevent the workings of national means of verification. I think you ladies and gentlemen can realize the psychological significance of a nation making such a commitment as that.

We are going to set up a joint consultative commission which will, in effect, act as a surveying agent that will watch over the operation of the agreement, to which ambiguous situations can be referred, which will be a forum for further discussion of the possible amendments to see how this treaty is working, and to make sure that it stays viable over the years.

This treaty will have indefinite duration, but if it doesn't work, if our supreme interests are jeopardized, there is a provision that on short notice either side can escape from the binding obligations under the treaty.

Turn, now, for a minute to the offensive side. As Henry said, what we are trying to do is to set up a useful device that will hold

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the situation while we negotiate, hopefully, a matching treaty; that is, to match the treaty in the ABM defense field. I think that the measures that we have succeeded in spelling out in this interim agreement with the Russians will do just that. There will be a commitment on their part not to build any more of these ICBMs that have concerned us over the years. That commitment will extend to not building such things as SS-9s, and there will be provisions that if the sides want to increase their submarine missiles, which, if you can say so, are a more benign form of weapons system than ICBMs, they may do so, but only at the price of a substantial reduction program in other weapons systems.

Keep this in mind when you think about the possibility of increasing SLBMs. It is not for free. It is at a very substantial price in terms of reductions of other weapons systems. Reductions have never before been successfully negotiated, so I think this ought to be considered a great accomplishment.

I think I had better stop at that, since I am going to have a chance to go into specifics. I understand that there are to be some questions at this point.

Q Mr. Smith, could you answer just a couple of basic things? On the question of the radar, could you give us an estimate of what percentage of the national territory will be protected by the ABM radar on each side?

Secondly, on the offensive side, the submarines, there are no figures in the Fact Sheet, and the phrasing there seems to be a little ambiguous. Could you give us what you consider to be, in terms of numbers, the current levels of submarines on each side?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: On the question of radar, I cannot give you a precise percentage. The radar coverage, of course, is not the essential consideration. No re-entry vehicle was ever killed by a radar. It takes a lot of interceptors, in addition to radar, to do a defensive job. The radar coverage, however, will be minute, and especially in the case of radar around ICBM fields, where there will be quantitative limitations as well as qualitative limitations, so only a relatively few radars will be permitted in these ICBM fields.

We are quite confident that a radar base for a nationwide or thick regional defense is not possible under the terms of this treaty.

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Now, in terms of numbers of submarines, I would like to reserve that until I can go into it more specifically.

Q On the limitation of two ABM sites, we are building two now in the Far West. Does that mean we abandon one of those around those ICBM silos and build another one around Washington?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: If we exercise our rights under the treaty, we will build a system around Washington. Our obligation under the treaty will be to have not more than one which we had designated as Grand Forks. So under the treaty the Malmstrom construction would be stopped.

Q Do the Russians complete their construction of submarines presently under construction? They have 17 operation and 25 presumably at some stage of construction. Will they be allowed to complete those before the freeze becomes effective?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Under the interim arrangement, they will be permitted to finish construction of submarines, yes. I would like to go into the whole submarine question in greater detail later.

Q Would you clear up the withdrawal rights from the treaty "..." if supreme interests are jeopardized and on six-month's notice"? Is that "and/or" or must both conditions be prevalent, a supreme interest endangered, does this then require six month's notice of withdrawal?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: That is correct. That is the same condition as in previous arms control treaties, such as the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Q Does this Commission decide whether or not supreme interests are involved?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: No. That is a unilateral decision for both countries.

Q Doesn't this allow them to protect all of their ICBMs while we protect only some of ours?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: No. This will permit them to protect a smaller percentage of their ICBMs than ours, since they have substantially more than we have.

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Q If after five years there is no comprehensive offensive agreement, does the interim agreement lapse?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: If the five years is past and the negotiations look fruitless, I would think we would not want to continue it. If the negotiations look as if they might still bear fruit, if both sides agree to extend the five-year arrangement, that is certainly in our field of vision.

Q The basic story is going to go out of this session. I think we have to get figures on submarines and other estimates, otherwise the story will go out in a gobbled way.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: This treaty will have no effect on warhead numbers. The United States and the Soviet Union will be free to mount as many warheads as they want. As you know, the United States has a very substantial advantage, and I do not see in the time period of this freeze that there is any prospect of its losing it.

Q What about the submarines, the question of figures? Is this figure of 42 Y Class submarines an accurate one that they will be allowed to complete, and we with 41?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I don't know about this figure of 42 submarines. I have seen all sorts of speculations about Soviet submarines, but it is perfectly clear that under this agreement if the Soviets want to pay the price of scrapping a substantial number of other important strategic weapons systems they can build additional submarines.

Q What submarines do they have under construction now? I think you are evading the point on the number of submarines they will be frozen at under this Treaty.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I am purposely evading the point because that it an intelligence estimate that I am not in a position to give out.

Q How many old submarines, the old submarines with three obsolete launchers on them, would they be able to convert?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I would have to answer that the same way. I am not in a position to describe the breakdown of the Soviet fleet between old and new submarines.

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Q You are leaving open the possibility of a very large Soviet superiority in the SLBM field.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I am leaving open the possibility that you are facing an indefinite period of time. We don't know how long it will last. If we negotiate a treaty within a year, then the Soviet submarine level, if they elect to follow this route, will be one thing. If it is two years, it will be another. There is no doubt that under this arrangement they could, at a high price, increase their submarine fleet.

Q Mr. Ambassador, the question is whether the Soviets will be able to complete their construction of Y Class submarines and modernize their older submarines to become new Y Class submarines and if they do all of this and pay the price, as you said, of retiring the SS-7 and SS-8 missiles, what is the advantage to them, to retire the missiles, for example, and keep these submarines, do they have a significant advantage if they do that?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I cannot tell you what the factors making facilities at force planning are. All I can do is explain the provisions of these treaties. Now, what the Soviets will do with the rights under this arrangement is something that we can not know.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have time for just one more question. We are running short of time. Dr. Kissinger had one comment to make.

Q We have had only ten minutes of questions.

MR. ZIEGLER: The entire delegation and Dr. Kissinger will be available at the press center later tonight.

DR. KISSINGER: Since I am not quite as constrained or don't feel as constrained as Ambassador Smith, lest we build up a profound atmosphere of mystery about the submarine issue, I will straighten it out as best I can.

The base number of Soviet submarines is in dispute. It has been in dispute in our intelligence estimate exactly how much it is, though our intelligence estimates are in the range that was suggested.

Q 41 to 43?

DR. KISSINGER: I am not going to go beyond what I have said. It is in that general range.

The Soviet estimate of their program is slightly more exhaustive. They, of course, have the advantage that they know what it is precisely. (Laughter.)

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Now the provisions of the agreement, as I understand it, are that the Soviet Union can convert land-based missiles of a category of which we estimate that they have 210, plus 30-odd missiles on older nuclear submarines, into submarines or submarine-based launchers.

This, then, would give them a figure of submarines and Launchers substantially about the level that is now estimated as being under construction. This level has a upper ceiling.

Now, there are two things to be said: One, they can reach this level only at the sacrifice of existing weapon systems and, therefore, it would represent the first reduction of one category of weapons. Second, in the absence of this agreement, the Soviet Union was building submarines at the rate of eight or nine a year in any event, and their decision to build these submarines at that rate seems to have been fixed for some time.

Therefore, the ceiling on submarines has to be seen in terms of two factors: Factor one, where would the Soviet Union be without that ceiling? And without that ceiling the Soviet Union would be some 50 percent higher over the period of time if it exercised its full capacity of production. Second, in order to reach that ceiling, the Soviet Union will have to trade in heavy land-based missiles and/or submarine-based missiles of older types. So that in addition to arresting the momentum of the submarine construction program, there is also a reduction of weapons that would under other circumstances not have been reduced.

The next question that can be asked then: Well, perhaps the best way to deal with this Soviet submarine program would have been to build more submarines of our own.

I think those of you who followed defense matters know that the United States has no plan at this moment -- and for that matter had no plan before this agreement -- to build submarines over the five-year period of the freeze that this agreement was lasting. So we have to remember that we were prepared to live with a condition without an agreement that was significantly worse than it is with the agreement and; secondly, that the freeze is purchased by the reduction of several hundred -- if the Soviets exercise all their rights -- land-based missiles and another category of sea-based missiles.

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This is the context in which the submarine decision has to be seen.

Q On a point of fact, Henry, didn't the Defense Secretary announce a program for 10 ULMS or Trident Missiles?

DR. KISSINGER: None of those will become operational until after the period of the freeze.

Q Could I make a plea to you and Ron as well? It has taken 30 months to get this treaty. The Senate of the United States wants to know what is in it. There is an argument about it. We have been out of our hotel an hour and a half. We get ten minutes of questions and tomorrow it is going to be our fault for screwing it up and creating political trouble. Can somebody else pass up the champagne and let's keep this going?

MR. ZIEGLER: I suppose you are asking by passing up the champagne that Henry not go to the signing. That has to be his decision. Ambassador Smith must go to the signing. I will offer you this alternative, recognizing the fact that you have been here an hour and a half, and recognizing the fact that we have to have the material to put together to provide you which, as Ambassador Smith said, was put together as quickly as we can. The option is to have the briefing, as we have scheduled, at the press center immediately after the signing.

Q You know what kind of a brawl that will be.

MR. ZIEGLER: We would be willing to return here to take your questions if that is what you would like.

Q Will we have to go through the Russian commentary on this one.

MR. ZIEGLER: That is exactly the dilemma.

Q I have one question that I know would clear up my confusion and maybe some others' confusion. Does the treaty permit the Soviets to complete their present submarine construction without penalty?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

Q Will these Tridents replace old Polaris Submarines in that case?

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DR. KISSINGER: No ULMS submarines will be operational until after the freeze is over. There will be provisions in the Treaty for when an existing weapon has to be scrapped in terms of the constructions of the follow-on program. If, in the development of ULMS such a point should be reached before the end of the freeze and if the treaty has not been extended by agreement, then of course those scrapping provisions would go into effect. Otherwise the ULMS would be a follow-on system to the existing one.

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me offer this proposal to you: The signing takes place at 11:00 o'clock. At that time the fact that the SALT agreement is being signed is indeed a fact. There is a briefing scheduled at about 11:20 at the Press Center, a joint briefing between the United States and the Soviet Union. That will be short. We will arrange to make that short. Following that, and giving those who are on deadline -- and I don't believe anyone has any serious problem at that point -- that is the point when we will return to this location, following the joint briefing which we are committed to at the International Press Center. So, if that gets underway at about 11:30, it will be over by about 12:00. We will return here at about 12:30. We will take your questions. Dr. Kissinger will be here and we will proceed.

Q Can't we do it at the hotel?

MR. ZIEGLER: If there is a change, gentlemen, if there is a change in the location, if we can find a place at the hotel, we will arrange for it.

THE PRESS: Thank you, gentlemen.

END (AT 10:55 P.M. Moscow Time)

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OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Moscow, U.S.S.R.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

INTOURIST HOTEL

1:00 A.M.

MR. ZIEGLER: Let's continue now with the session we began over at the Embassy earlier tonight. Dr. Kissinger's remarks will be on the record.

We are still in the process of typing the agreement. We hope to have that ready for you as soon as Dr. Kissinger is finished. We have had to type that from the originally signed document, because that was the only copy that we had available.

But we can proceed now. We will go right to your questions.

Q Henry, for factual purposes, I think it would help a great deal here, since we do not have the figures available, could you go into the existing figures that are available? In the public domain there are figures.

DR. KISSINGER: In what category?

Q Well, I think because this does cut across the whole range and one will be looking at the total figures of offensive weapons, even the bomber-delivered weapons would have relevance here.

DR. KISSINGER: First, the current figures are that in the field of ICBMs the United States has 1,054 and the Soviet Union has about 1,600. In the submarine field, the United States has about 656 and the Soviet Union has, again depending on what missiles you count, something between 680 and 700-plus. I will go into those figures in a minute when I explain the submarine agreement.

The Soviet Union has been building missiles at the rate of something like 250 a year. If I get arrested here for espionage, gentlemen, we will know who is to blame.

Q What kind of missiles? Do you mean intercontinental?

DR. KISSINGER: I am talking about intercontinental, and it has been building submarine missiles at the rate of 128 a year. So this is the backdrop against which you have to assess the agreement.

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Therefore, on any day you would have picked over the last year, over the last two years, and on any day you are going to pick in the future, you will be able to demonstrate a Soviet numerical advantage. Moreover, it was a numerical advantage that was growing, because in the ICBM field we have, as you know, no ongoing program.

In the submarine field, as the question indicated, to which I responded earlier, we also have no program for missiles that will be operational. In the submarine field we have now no submarine under construction. The first submarine that we have that would become operational would do so early in 1979 or late in 1978.

Therefore, any time over the next five years we were confronting a numerical margin that was growing, and a margin, moreover, which we could do nothing to reverse in that five-year period. Therefore, the question of whether the freeze perpetuates a Soviet numerical superiority is beside the point.

The question is: What would this margin have been without the freeze? That is the justification for the margin.

Second: Now, then, what are the figures going to be? The Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, gross or net -- in other words, they will not grow beyond 1,618.

With respect to the submarines, we have developed a very complicated form, and I have to spend some time in explaining it to you. It may also explain why there were so many night sessions this week here in Moscow, first between the President and Brezhnev, and then between me and the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Smirnov and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Basically, the Soviet submarines are frozen at the level they now have. Beyond that, however, since they had an ongoing program of eight submarines a year, they are permitted to trade in old missiles and old submarines for new submarines up to a total level of either 62 submarines or 950 missiles.

Q May I ask a question there? When you say they are frozen at the level, you mean operational and under construction?

DR. KISSINGER: Operational and under construction.

Q Which is?

DR. KISSINGER: Which is in dispute, first between our intelligence agencies, and second between us and the Soviets. Our intelligence agencies give us a certain range. Over a period of a year, this always comes out right, because you can see them. But at any given moment, you cannot be absolutely sure. There is always a spread of two or three. At any rate, it is in the range that was discussed at the briefing.

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When it was asked at the briefing, those figures were not far off. The Soviets claim that they have more than that. As I said at the briefing, the Soviets may not tell us exactly what they have, but they are in a better position to know than we, painful as this is to admit.

Let me finish going through these numbers. Under the formula that we have adopted, the Soviet Union can convert 210 old ICBMs and 30 old submarine-launched missiles into new submarine-launched missiles. In other words, in order to get more submarines, they have to give up 240 old missiles -- older missiles; still useful, but older missiles. That, in effect, is the rough formula.

Now, the formula is somewhat complicated by the fact that they have two types of Soviet boats, one with 12 and the other with 16 missiles. So the Soviets have to make a choice of 62 of fewer missiles or lesser boats of more missiles, but that is a refinement into which we do not have to get in detail.

This is the submarine formula. It is, in short, that the Soviets are frozen at a level of what is currently operational or under construction.

That level had to be somewhat arbitrarily established as between their claims and our assessments. At any rate, beyond that level, they have to trade in all old missiles for new submarines up to a total ceiling that cannot exceed 62 submarines for 950 missiles. Again, I ask you to remember that that level of 62 submarines over the period of the freeze must be compared with the level of 80 to 90 submarines that would have been achieved without the freeze, in which circumstances there would not have been the retirement of the 240 older missiles on top of it.

Now, this is roughly the arithmetic. Does that answer your question?

Q. Yes.

Q. I had a question on that. What in the definition of the words "under construction"?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, some of the more profound minds in the bureaucracy, which is not necessarily saying a great deal, (laughter) have addressed this question, and I believe that the definition of under construction that has been adopted is when the hull sections move into the shed where they are assembled into a submarine. Apparently the submarine is first built in sections. It is then moved into an assembly plant and at that point the submarine is considered under construction. And this may account for the difference in our assessments of what the Soviets have under construction and what the Soviets tell us they have under construction. That is to say they may count the hull sections and we count them only when they enter the shed. There is some technical term for the shed, but at any rate where they put it together.

Q. Can you tell us what the arbitrary compromise line was you established with them between these two? Was it 45 or something like that?

DR. KISSINGER: Because of the difficulty of the fact that some of the Soviet boats have 12 missiles and some have 16 missiles, the Soviet argument was that they had 48 submarines under construction with 768 missiles. Our assessment was less. The figure we adopted is 710, if you consider new missiles, and 740 if you add in the 30 of the older missiles that they have on submarines.

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In either event, if they want to get up to the ceiling of 950 modern submarine launched missiles, they have to retire 30 of the old submarine launched missiles plus 210 of the ICBMs.

Q That are included in the 1618, is that correct?

DR. KISSINGER: That are included in the 1618. In other words, as a result of this agreement, the Soviets exercise every option they have under the agreement -- and, of course, they are not required to exercise it -- but if they exercise the maximum option, then the figure would be reduced by 210 and would be 1408.

Q And the other number would be 950?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. But, actually, Max, if you do the arithmetic, you can't get up to exactly 950 by any combination of 16 and 12 class boats. I think the maximum they can get is 944, but that is a refinement we don't have to get into.

Q Well, they could keep some of the 30?

DR. KISSINGER: They can keep some of the 30. They can piece together the 950, but then they have to keep the old missiles. They cannot come up with 950 new missiles from where they are now under any new assessment.

Q Dr. Kissinger, isn't there a global figure of missiles that both of us are now operating under and we can have any mix we choose?

DR. KISSINGER: No, we cannot have any mix we choose. We can have a mix up to a certain ceiling in submarines and we can retire only the older missiles. It is not permitted under this agreement to take new missiles and turn them into submarine missiles.

In other words, they cannot simply shift SS11s into submarines any more than we can turn Minutemen into submarines. Under this agreement we have the right to convert 54 Titans into three submarines. The missiles built before 1964 can be converted into submarines which gives us three and it gives them a larger number, but in any event there is a global figure.

You are quite right. There is a global figure with a certain freedom to mix, not a total freedom to mix but a certain freedom to mix.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how many of our submarine missiles are being MIRV'd and how many of the Minutemen are being MIRV'd?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know exactly what the number of Minutemen is that is being MIRV'd. Of the submarines, my trouble is I know the number but I don't know whether it is classified or not.

Q It is not.

DR. KISSINGER: It is not? What is it then?

Q. You have deployed eight.

DR. KISSINGER: But you don't know how many we are converting.

Q You are converting 31. (Laughter.)

DR. KISSINGER: I thought all my former staff members joined candidates. (Laughter.)

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That is essentially correct, but whether the submarine is MIRV'd or not has nothing to do with whether it counts against the total. What counts against the total is the number of launchers, not the number of warheads on each launcher.

Q What I am trying to get at is the number of warheads available to both sides.

DR. KISSINGER: I didn't finish the answer to Murray's question, because he also asked me about bombers.

Q Also about bombers, and, Henry, Secretary Laird's posture statement for the current year does give a figure on warheads. I don't happen to have it with me.

DR. KISSINGER: I will give you a rough figure. Everything here is on the basis of reciprocity. Since I have given out the Soviet figures, I might as well give out the American figures. (Laughter)

We have now 460 bombers, and we expect to have 450 bombers at the end of the freeze period. Our assessment is that the Soviets have about 140 comparable bombers. So in terms of the total delivery vehicles on both sides during the freeze, if you count our overseas base forces, they are roughly equal. They are roughly about 2,500.

US accepts FBS concept

ICBMs 1054
SLBMs 616
B 52s 430
2160

This is not the best test by itself, because if you compare megatonnage, the Soviet Union has about three times as much. If you count warheads, we have about three times as much during the whole period of the freeze.

But during the period of the freeze, what you have to remember is that the weapons systems that are being frozen, as I pointed out in the other briefing, are the ones in which we had no building program during the period of the freeze, and, therefore, if you want to judge the relative strategic situation during the period of the freeze, you have to consider all the weapons systems, and there a rough parity is being maintained in terms of delivery vehicles. The Soviet Union has more megatonnage; we have more warheads.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you say that the Soviets would be increasing their strategic advantage if they were to exercise their options and convert these various ICBMs and others to submarines?

DR. KISSINGER: First, I know I keep repeating myself about the freeze point, but I cannot say often enough that in the absence of this agreement, the Soviet Union has the possibility of building eight submarines a year for the whole period of the freeze, assuming they do not expand their production capability. On that basis, the Soviet Union, if it continued to build what it is capable of building, could have between 80 and 90 submarines at the end of the freeze period, plus 210 ICBMs, plus 30 submarine-based missiles.

Another provision of this agreement, incidentally, is that missiles on submarines other than nuclear-powered submarines that are modernized are counted against the total of 950. Those missiles, of course, would be outside the agreement altogether.

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Therefore, the first thing one has to say is that the freeze, even without the conversion, is desired. With the conversion, it retires 240 Soviet launchers. On the other hand, I have to answer your question fairly: The 240 launchers that are being retired are less modern than the 240 launchers by which they are replaced.

The only thing you have to keep in mind is that it was not in our power to stop those 240 new launchers in any event. They are not being built as a result of the freeze. They were being built anyway.

Q A technical question: Of the old launchers, the ICBMs they retired would be SS-7 and -8?

DR. KISSINGER: That is correct.

Q And the submarines, if they decided to retire the old ones, would replace what?

DR. KISSINGER: Thirty to thirty-six missiles on the H-class submarines.

Q How about the G-class?

DR. KISSINGER: The G-class submarines can be retired. If they are modernized, they are counted against the 950. Do you see what I mean? They don't have to retire them. They do have to retire the H-class submarines if they want to go up to 950. They do not have to retire the G-class submarines, but if they modernize them, they are counted against the 950.

First of all, the G-class submarines are diesel. Second, the range of their missiles is between 300 and 700 miles, so they are more comparable to our forward-based systems than they are to strategic systems. Third, if these missiles are modernized, if they have a more modern missile on the G-class submarine than the one there now, then that missile is counted against the 950 total and reduces their ability to build nuclear-powered submarines.

It seems to us highly unreasonable to take this step, so we think that the G-class submarines are bound to get retired simply because they wear out. They are the oldest missile-carrying submarine they have.

Q May I ask a non-technical question? On defensive missiles, which they wanted, a treaty was signed to limit the number. On offensive, where we wanted a limitation, there was only a temporary agreement. Doesn't that seem as if we came out on the short end of the stick?

DR. KISSINGER: Not at all, because, first of all, the temporary agreement is linked to the continuation of the defensive treaty, because we have made it clear that the continuation of the defensive treaty depends importantly on there being a follow-on agreement on offensive weapons.

Secondly, with respect to these offensive weapons, the situation was so complex, there were so many weapons in the process of production, that it was an inevitable first step to get an end of the

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production for a while before one could make a rational agreement on the permanent arrangement. So we have not come out on the short end of the stick. If the offensive agreement lapses, we doubt seriously that the defensive agreement will continue.

Q On the question of warheads, since that seems to be an important part of the total number of ICBMs, you mentioned the fact that the number of warheads is not affected. Can you then talk about numbers of warheads we have and they have?

DR. KISSINGER: It is in the posture statement. Why don't you look it up? In the assessment we now have, it is about 2-1/2 times as many warheads, and we expect at the end of the freeze period we will have about three times as many warheads.

Q What is the prospect of their developing a MIRV?

DR. KISSINGER: You would have to assume that anything we can do, they can do, with perhaps some time.

Q How many years?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on it, but I think it is reasonable to assume that they will develop a MIRV during the freeze period.

Q Can you also discuss in a little more detail the consultative committee? What is its make-up? Who will be on it, and how will that go forward?

DR. KISSINGER: I frankly do not have the details on it.

Q. Can you discuss at all what you would like to see, or you think the United States would like to see happen in the next phase of the SALT discussions; the reductions, for example?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, we will try to convert the agreement into a permanent agreement. Second, we will try to include categories of weapons not now included, and may address the question of technological change, which is one of the great driving forces of the arms race at this particular point.

Q Has there been an agreement on time and place for resumption of a new round of SALT?

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DR. KISSINGER: There has not yet been an agreement, but we expect it to be within this year.

Q Sometime this year?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. We do not expect there to be a very long interval. We think we have the momentum now. We consider this, as I said in my opening remarks, a landmark agreement in the relations between the great powers and in the development of the arms race it is something that administrations have striven for for the better part of the 1960s, and which we believe can give us a basis to make very significant advances.

Q On that point, Henry, what about reopening the question of a comprehensive test ban treaty?

DR. KISSINGER: We have been, in principle, prepared to do this. The obstacle has been the debate about inspection, and we are willing to restudy the issue.

Q Does this prohibit them from further testing of anti-satellite systems?

DR. KISSINGER: No, it doesn't prohibit them from testing, but interference with national means of detection would be considered contrary to the treaty, and there is a provision to that effect in the treaty.

Q But if they continue to develop them -- we know they have been -- what happens then?

DR. KISSINGER: It is not contrary to the treaty. What is contrary to the treaty is to use an anti-satellite system, and that would be the issue. There is no way they could use an anti-satellite system without, in effect, causing us to abrogate the treaty. I mean, if they did it on a substantial scale -- I don't want to speak of every individual case.

Q Could you say what was the last hang-up that was settled today?

DR. KISSINGER: As I told you when I met with you in Salzburg, there were four or five issues that had been unsettled. The President took those up with Mr. Brezhnev on Tuesday. As you remember, there were two sessions lasting well into the night. That settled two of them. There were then two other issues that remained to be settled. One was a somewhat esoteric technical one. It was esoterically technical on one level, but it had some significant implications. The second one had to do with the calculation from which we derived the point at which the trade-in of old missiles had to occur, what the number was that had to be traded in to get up to the ceiling, and how you handle the problem of the G-class submarines.

Q When were those settled?

DR. KISSINGER: There was one session that lasted until 4:00 o'clock on Wednesday. There was another session that lasted until 3:00 o'clock last night. This morning at 11:30, at a meeting, those two issues were settled. So at 3:00 o'clock it looked as if we would have to do at least another day or two of work on these two problems, but then this morning we had a meeting at 11:30 and it began to break. By noon I called Ron and told him that it was beginning to break, and at 1:00 we had it settled.

Then the problem was to get the agreement drafted, and I think it was the first time in the history of Soviet-American relations that joint instructions were sent to two delegations, so that no misunderstandings could occur,

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and where we were kept informed by the Soviet side about meetings going on in the Soviet delegation in order to speed up the drafting process.

Then the delegation flew here in the American delegation's plane and arrived about 9:00 o'clock with the treaty draft in their hands, because the decisions that were made at 1:00 still had to be put into treaty language.

All we did this morning was to arrive at the general framework. The delegations then had to put it into language that will be put before you soon.

So a tremendous amount of work was done by the delegation, and it showed how rapidly things could move in diplomacy when both sides want to move.

Q Who was at that meeting?

DR. KISSINGER: Who was at which meeting?

Q At the meeting at which things began to break?

DR. KISSINGER: On our side it was myself and several staff members. On the Soviet side, it was Deputy Prime Minister Smirnov, Foreign Minister Gromyko, Ambassador Dobrynin, the head of the American Desk in the Soviet Foreign Office, Komiyenko, and those are all the members.

On my staff it was Mr. Sonnenfeldt, Mr. Lord and Mr. Hyland.

Q One clarifying question on the submarine. I believe the public record shows it was the United States who pressed publicly for the inclusion of the submarines ---

DR. KISSINGER: That is correct.

Q Secretary Laird said he wouldn't favor a treaty unless submarines were included.

DR. KISSINGER: That is correct.

Q So therefore, the idea that the United States got stuck with a submarine deal ---

DR. KISSINGER: That is an absurdity. It is a total absurdity. It was the United States which insisted that the submarines be included. The United States was in a rather complex position to recommend a submarine deal since we were not building any and the Soviets were building eight or nine a year, which isn't the most brilliant bargaining position I would recommend people to find themselves in.

Therefore, we developed a formula by which the Soviets could trade in some of their older missiles for submarines as long as they agreed to put a ceiling on the total construction of submarines. We discussed the issue with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both in terms of what could be done with a rapid American submarine program, and in terms of the complete proposal that emerged. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have supported this proposal and I do not think they are the most Dovish members of the American establishment.

So this is not something that the Soviets forced on us. It is something that we urged on the Soviets in a field in which we were not under any circumstances going to build a submarine before 1979, and they had an on-going program. So I can understand why there were several meetings of the Soviet government on this issue this week.

Q What manner of verification can be effective against submarine numbers?

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DR. KISSINGER: As some of you know, we started this whole process of negotiation, to the dismay of some of you, very slowly, because we spent six months within the Government making the most painstaking study of the possibilities of verification, and before we agreed to formulate any proposition, we wanted to make sure what the possibilities of verification were, what the margin of error was, what counter-measures we could take if we detected violations, and what risks we were running at each level.

We are confident that we have adequate means of verification. That does not mean that one or two submarines might not slip through, although we don't think so. What it does mean is I would say it is extremely unlikely that the Soviet Union could build submarines of a number sufficient to upset the strategic balance in violation of this agreement without our knowing it and particularly if you consider what the risks of detection would represent for the Soviet Union.

So we are confident that we can do this by national means of detection. But I must say also that I can't conceive of a country entering an agreement of freeze in order to cheat, given present national means of detection.

Q Are you confident that this agreement can be sold to the Senate, and have you been giving some consultation to people like John Stennis and others?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, we have been consulting with key Senators. We believe that the overwhelming majority of the Senate, once it recognizes the nature of the agreement, the long-range implications of the agreement, and its character, will vote for it.

I do not deny that the initial reaction of some people will be to look at the gap in numbers. But once they understand the consideration I put before you, that is to say what the gap would be without this agreement, and the fact that this agreement for the first time brings agreed reductions in the missile forces of another country, I believe that many of those who express some hesitation will come around. We expect overwhelming passage.

Q May I follow by asking are the Joint Chiefs unanimously in support of it?

DR. KISSINGER: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have unanimously supported the proposal we put forward last night and which was accepted this morning.

Q I think my question has been partially answered. I believe all your figures, but who is going to check into all this and what kind of inspection are you going to have?

DR. KISSINGER: The inspection of the system is through national means of detection. In other words, each side will have to check the other by its own national means of detection, and we are highly confident of those.

Q Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Smith raised the point of this being the first time where each side has acknowledged or deliberately allowed itself to remain vulnerable to attack by the other side and talked about psychological and political ramifications.

I wonder if you could address yourself to that?

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DR. KISSINGER: Well, to the extent that neither side is building a territorial defense, it is, of course, vulnerable, and to the extent that neither side can destroy the retaliatory force of its opponent enough to prevent a counter-attack on its population, it remains vulnerable.

The implications of this are what they have always been over the last five years, because both sides are now vulnerable to each other, and, therefore, the simplistic notion of the early 1960s which measured deterrent by the amount of civilian carnage that could be inflicted by one side on the other were always wrong; hence, to consider the mass use of nuclear weapons in terms of the destruction of civilian populations, one faces a political impossibility, not to speak of a moral impossibility.

But this has been a fact, now, for five or six years.

Q Will the SALT machinery be kept in place for continuing negotiations, and if not, what will be the case?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, we have now developed what we believe to be a rather good system for conducting these negotiations; that is to say, we have an extremely able delegation, and very able negotiator who conducts the ordinary business of the negotiations. We have in Washington a series of committees that make the technical studies and that back up the negotiator.

Over the last two years, when the negotiations have reached a deadlock, we have used the mechanism of Presidential exchanges with the Soviet leaders to break the deadlock, in each case by compromise that turned out to be fair to both sides, and I think, having done this now -- and I must say again that the experience of this week confirms it -- that we can talk to each other now in a way that would have been inconceivable five years ago, and in a way in which few countries can talk to each other now, because many of them don't have the technical competence.

So when you talk to each other about the deployment of missile systems, when you have the sort of conversations we have had to have this week in assessing what missiles should be counted, a degree of, if not political confidence, at least confidence in each other's methods of looking at it develops that gives one some hope that these negotiations can be continued in this general framework.

Now, whether we will continue alternating between Helsinki and Vienna, or whether we will choose a permanent place in which these negotiations will go on, that, frankly, has not been decided yet. But we, on our side at least, are very tempted and inclined to continue the procedures that have brought us to this point.

Q Can you tell us if the negotiations at the personal level between the President and the leaders of the Soviet Union this week on this subject have also produced some progress in solving other international problems, in particular Southeast Asia?

DR. KISSINGER: No. I will not go into other topics, but I will say that all topics this week have been discussed with the same frankness. Not all of them are as amenable to bilateral solution as the one we have discussed, but we have had very frank and very thorough discussions.

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Q What were the two issues that the President settled with the Soviet leaders on Tuesday night? Did they concern the submarine issue as well?

DR. KISSINGER: No. One of them had to do with ABM systems. I don't want to go into it in any more detail.

Q What is the other one?

DR. KISSINGER: The other one involved the discussion of mobile missiles.

Q What is left on the agenda now for substantive work by the leaders? Are they done now or is there more?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, they have covered by now almost every topic of significance that affects our two countries, and, of course, there are a number of parallel discussions going on. As you know, Secretary Rogers has been having a series of discussions, and I have been having a series of discussions, in parallel.

So the leaders will often set a general framework which is then being pusued by others.

In general, I would say all topics of significance have been covered, but it is envisaged that there will be one or two more wrapup sessions before the meeting breaks up.

Q Henry, was the United States opposed to on-site inspection?

DR. KISSINGER: No. Early in the negotiations we asked for on-site inspection. One had to do with MIRV's, which are not covered by this agreement. The other had to do with the ABM system. Once we analyzed the mechanism of on-site inspection, we found what Jerry Smith pointed out, that the capability of cheating against on-site inspection is very great, and the national means of detection are more reliable for the kind of agreement we have made here.

I am not saying as we get further down the road with more esoteric problems -- particularly as we address the problem of technological change -- that we may not find some on-site inspection may prove necessary. But for this agreement, we really felt that we were better off with national means, and in all the studies of the verification panel in 1969, this conclusion was confirmed.

To answer your question, there was never a case in which the Soviet Union asked for on-site inspection and we refused it.

Q Why were they opposed to on-site inspection?

DR. KISSINGER: It has been a firm Soviet position in every armament negotiation in the post-war period that on-site inspection is too intrusive, and it has, therefore, generally been resisted, and in those negotiations in which the principle was accepted, such as the nuclear test ban, it was accepted with so many restrictions that its actual operation made it very easy to defeat.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on the MIRV, aren't we really, by deploying MIRV's ourselves so rapidly, kind of forcing them or encouraging them into the MIRV business?

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DR. KISSINGER: This is a debate that has been going on for the entire postwar period; namely, whether our technological change compels the Soviet technological change, or whether the two technological changes are not occurring somewhat in parallel, and on the whole, the Soviet Union will do what it is technologically capable of doing.

You remember the debate about the hydrogen bomb in the early 1960s in which one argument against the hydrogen bomb was that if we developed it, the Soviet Union would be forced into following suit. As matters developed, we exploded our bomb six months before the Soviet Union did, making it obvious that we did not lead them but that they were pursuing a parallel evolution.

I think it is safe to say that the Soviet Union has been engaged in the first step toward MIRV at a time when we have not yet deployed MIRV, and I would not, therefore, accept the proposition.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 1:45 A.M.)

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

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Said this sub-
& need have
figures that
Hatfield asked
you. Like 16 & 18
for example &
they said they had
been declassified
in a public hearing
Moore said - he gave
them to the committee
in a public hearing

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